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Abstract. This paper discusses questions about communication of probabilistic knowledge 
in the light of current theories of agent communication. It will argue that there is a semantic 
gap between these theories and research areas related to probabilistic knowledge representa-
tion and communication, that creates very serious theoretical problems if agents that reason 
probabilistically try to use the communication framework provided by these theories. The 
paper proposes a new formal model, which generalizes current agent communication theo-
ries (at least the standard FIPA version of these theories) to handle probabilistic knowledge 
communication. We propose a new probabilistic logic as the basis for the model and new 
communication principles and communicative acts to support this kind of communication.  
1 Introduction 
This paper will present a theoretical study about which kind of meaning can be assigned 
to the communication of probabilistic knowledge between agents in Multiagent Systems 
(MAS), at least when current theories for agent communication are considered. The work 
starts in section 2, presenting several considerations showing that exists a semantic gap be-
tween current agent communication theories and research areas related to probabilistic 
knowledge representation and communication. This gap creates very serious theoretical 
problems if the designer of agents that reason probabilistically tries to use the communication 
framework provided by these theories to model and implement all agent's communication 
tasks.  
To minimize this gap we propose a new formal model in section 3, which generalizes the 
formal model, used in FIPA agent communication standards [6], to handle probabilistic 
knowledge communication. We propose a new probabilistic logic, called SLP, as the basis 
for the new model. The SLP logic is compatible with the logic used as the foundation of 
FIPA standards (the SL logic) in the sense that all valid formulas (theories) of SL are also 
valid formulas of SLP. The axiomatic system of SLP is correct. It is also complete, if the 
axiomatic system of SL is complete.  
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Based on SLP logic we propose a minimum set of new communication principles in sec-
tion 4 that are able to correlate probabilistic reasoning with communication related inference 
tasks. Two new communicative acts are proposed that would allow agents to communicate 
basic probabilistic propositions without having to agree previously on a probabilistic content 
format.  
This is the most important result of the paper. To our knowledge, this is the first work 
that tries to integrate in a single probabilistic-logical framework two entirely different ap-
proaches to understand and model communication. What we have done, after have carefully 
isolated formal axiomatic agency and communication theories used by FIPA, was to define 
the minimum set of new axioms necessary and sufficient to support an probabilistic form of 
assertive and query communicative acts. We also maintain the principles, acts and axioms as 
simple as possible to be able to easily assess how much we were departing from classical 
Speech Act theory. We believe, that given the circumstances, albeit a conservative approach, 
this is the correct approach. The result was a clear and simple generalization of current FIPA 
axiomatic communication and agent theories that is able to handle basic probabilistic com-
munication between agents. 
A secondary, but interesting, result of the paper is the (relative) completeness of SLP 
logic. To our knowledge, there is no other axiomatization for an epistemic and temporal mo-
dal logic, which allow probabilities for first order modal sentences, and is proved complete. 
2 Motivation 
This work has started with a very practical and concrete problem, which was how to 
model (and implement) the communication tasks of all agents from a real MAS: the 
AMPLIA system [13,8]. We have decided to use only standard languages and protocols to 
model and implement these tasks in order to allow reusability of the agent’s knowledge and 
to allow an easier interoperation of AMPLIA with others intelligent learning systems. To this 
purpose we decided to use FIPA standards based on two assumptions: (a) the standards are a 
good way to ensure MAS knowledge reusability and interoperability; (b) the formal basis of 
FIPA standards offer an abstract and architecture independent way to model all communica-
tion tasks of the system, allowing a high level description of the communication phenomena. 
However, we have found that it was impossible to meet even most basic communication 
requirements of AMPLIA using only FIPA standards. All AMPLIA's agents use and com-
municate probabilistic (bayesian) knowledge, but FIPA standards assigns no meaning to 
probabilistic knowledge representation or communication. 
Of course it is possible to try to “hide” all probabilistic knowledge in a special new con-
tent format, allowing, for example, that Bayesian Networks (BN) should be “encoded” in 
this format and then embedded as contents of FIPA Agent Communication Language (ACL) 
communicative acts. The knowledge to be passed as contents of assertive acts like FIPA’s 
inform, can be considered as a logical proposition that the agent believe it is true. In being 
so, it is possible to assume that, from a communication point of view, it is only necessary that 
the agent believe that the “hidden” probabilistic knowledge transported by the act be true. 
Any other meaning related the probabilistic knowledge do not need be “known” by the agent 
in respect to communication tasks or in any reasoning related to these tasks.  
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2.1 The Research Problem 
The approach to “hide” probabilistic knowledge solves some basic implementation prob-
lems if theoretical or formal aspects of this kind of communication are not considered. How-
ever, when analyzed more carefully this approach does not seem to be very sound.  
The first problem is related to the fact that formal semantics of FIPA ACL is based on 
axiomatic logical theories of intention and communication [4,5,11,12]. Besides particular pre 
and pos-conditions (expressed as logical axioms) for some act, these theories will define 
clearly when the act should be emitted, what are the intentions of the sender agents when it 
send the act, which effects this act should cause in the receiver agent and so on. The knowl-
edge transported in these acts are only logical propositions, but these propositions are related 
to internal beliefs, intentions and choices of the agents and must be used in reasoning process 
that will decides when to emit some act or how the act received should be understood. This 
imply that even if you have some probabilistic knowledge "hidden" in the contents of a 
communicative act, then this knowledge cannot be used in any internal reasoning process 
related to communication tasks, because formal model and theories that fundament this rea-
soning (at least in FIPA standards) are purely logical and do not allow reasoning about prob-
abilities. This generates a strange situation when you have an agent with probabilistic reason-
ing abilities: the agent can "think" probabilistic in all internal reasoning, but never can "think" 
probabilistically when talking, listening and trying to understand (i.e. communicating) other 
agents, at least when purely logical theories are used to fundament the communication. It has 
the additional consequence that an agent that reason only by probabilistic means cannot "use" 
FIPA acts, languages and protocols if it wants to keep theoretical consistency.  
The second question arises from epistemological and linguistic considerations, when we 
take into account agents that can reason probabilistically. We will assume that the agent uses 
subjective (bayesian) reasoning and can assign probabilities to his beliefs, that is, the agent 
can reason with degrees of belief. Assuming only basic rationality for this kind of agent, then, 
if it has some probabilistic belief and needs to inform this belief to another agent it will need 
to be sure that the proper degree of belief be also correctly informed. For instance, if it 
strongly believes (90% of chance) that it will rain tomorrow and need to inform this belief to 
another agent to change his behavior (for example, to cancel some encounter), then it will 
need to convince the other agent to have the same strong belief about the possibility to rain 
tomorrow. Some appropriate locus for the transportation of this kind of probability needs to 
be found in current theories of communication. The problem is that the Speech Act Theory 
of Searle and Grice, which provides the epistemological and linguistic basis for formal 
communication theories, simply do not consider the possibility of agents to communicate 
knowledge of probabilistic nature because the most basic semantic "unit" of knowledge that 
is considered by the theory is a logical proposition. Consequently, all formal theories of 
communication (including, the Theory of Action, Intention and Communication of Cohen, 
Levesque [4,5] and Sadek [11,12]) have adopted this point of view and do not consider prob-
abilistic knowledge communication as a real possibility. 
Together both questions create a very interesting dilemma: if an agent use probabilistic 
reasoning and need to inform some probabilistic belief to another agent it will have serious 
problems to do this task, because current linguistic theories say that there is no means to ac-
complish it (according to these theories there is no locus to communicate probabilities). 
These theories, at least in their formal counterpart, say even more, stating that even if you can 
send this probabilistic knowledge there is no way to consider this knowledge when reasoning 
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about communication tasks. This surely is not a good situation from a theoretical point of 
view, and our work will try to start to correct this problem, at least in the limited sense of 
FIPA formal agent communication model.  
2.2 Related Work 
The problems expressed in previous sub-section are not addressed in recent research lit-
erature about ACLs (see [3]). Research in this area and related areas of agent societies and 
social interaction is more focused in the study about logical aspects of social institutions, 
including trust relationship, intentional semantics for social interaction and similar concepts, 
but not in checking the role of probabilities in these concepts. A similar situation also occurs 
in the research area of probabilistic knowledge representation for MAS. Main papers in those 
areas are focused on the question of how to communicate and distribute BN probabilistic 
knowledge between agents [14], keeping the inference processes consistent, efficient and 
epistemologically sound. These pieces of research offer a separate form of knowledge repre-
sentation and communication not related to ACL research. Our work intends to start to 
bridge this gap, by showing how probabilistic knowledge can be included in the FIPA com-
munication framework in an integrated and uniform way. 
Our approach to formalize the communication of probabilistic knowledge is based on the 
idea that the best way to do this, in a way that is integrated and compatible with current agent 
communication theories (at least in the FIPA case), is to use a modal logic that can handle 
probabilities, that is, to use a probabilistic logic. In terms of Artificial Intelligence research, 
probabilistic logics were first described by Nilsson [10], already using a possible-worlds 
model to define the semantic of his logic. The initial work of Nilsson was profoundly ex-
tended, in the beginnings of 1990, by the works of Halpern [9], Abadi [1] and Bacchus [2] 
mainly related to epistemic (or doxastic) probabilistic modal logics. Currently there is also an 
active line of research based on probabilistic extensions to the CTL* temporal logic from 
Emerson and Srinavan, like the PCTL logic of Segala. However, due to the nature of the 
theories of agent communication, that require BDI modal operators, we focused our research 
only on epistemic probabilistic modal logics.    
3 SLP Probabilistic Logic 
3.1 FIPA’s SL Logic 
The SL (Semantic Language) is a BDI-like modal logic with equality that fundaments 
FIPA communication standards. This logic was defined by Sadek's work [11,12], which 
attributes a model-based semantics for SL logic. In SL, there is no means of attributing any 
subjective probability (or degree of belief) to a particular belief of some agent, so it is not 
possible to represent or reason about probabilistic knowledge in this logic.  
Besides the usual operators and quantifiers of the predicate logic with equality, SL con-
tains modal operators to express the beliefs (B(a,ϕ)), choices C(a,ϕ) and intentions (I(a,ϕ)) 
of an agent a. SL also has a relatively obscure modal operator that defines an “absolute uncer-
tainty” that an agent can have about some belief. The U(a,ϕ) operator, however, does not 
admit any kind of degree or uncertainty level. There is no clear connection between probabil-
ity theory and U operator. It is also possible to build action expressions that can be connected 
in series e1;e2;...;en, in alternates e1|e2 or verified by an agent a (a,e)?. Temporal and possibil-
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ity assertions can be made based on the fact that an action or event has happened (Done(e, 
ϕ)), on the possibility that an action or event may happen (Feasible(e, ϕ)) and on which 
agent is responsible for an action (Agent(a,e,ϕ)). 
3.2 The SLP Logic 
The extension of the SL logic is called SLP, for Semantic Language with Probabilities, 
and it is defined through the extension of the SL formal model. For such purpose, SLP will 
incorporate numerical operator, relations and expressions, and terms that denote probabilities 
expressing the subjective probability (degree of belief) of a given sentence or statement being 
true.  
The probabilistic term BP(a,ϕ) is specific for SLP and informs the probability of a 
proposition ϕ be true with respect to the beliefs of agent a, that is, it defines the subjective 
probability assigned to ϕ by a. For example, BP(a,∃(x)(P(x)) ≤ 1 express the fact that the 
subjective probability assigned by agent a to the possibility that some element of the domain 
satisfies P(x) is less than 1. 
The model-based semantics for formulas of SLP is defined over a set Φ of symbols for 
variables, functions, predicates, primitive actions, agents and constants through models M 
with the following structure: 
    M = <W, Agt, Evt, Obj, B, C, E, AGT,  σ, RCF, µ > 
The elements W, Agt, Obj, Evt, B, C, E, AGT  and σ are part of the formal model originally 
defined for SL by Sadek [12]. They define the set of possible worlds (W), agents (Agt), primi-
tive events (Evt), objects (Obj) and causative agent for primitive events (AGT) of SLP. They 
also define the set of accessibility relations for beliefs (B), choices (C) and future worlds (E) 
of SLP. The mapping σ denotes a standard first-order logic interpretation that attributes, for 
each possible world, function and predicate symbol in Φ a correspondent element in Agt ∪ 
Obj ∪ Evt  (the logical domain of SLP).  
The elements µ and RCF are new elements specifically defined to SLP. The set µ is a set 
of mappings that attributes to each agent a a discrete probability distribution function µa  on  
the set of possible-worlds W. The basic restriction to this set of mappings is that any mapping 
µa must respect the restrictions for any discrete probability function. The symbol RCF de-
notes the (up to isomorphism) closed field of real numbers. RCF it is the domain for the 
purely numerical formulas of SLP and includes addition and multiplication operations on real 
numbers, the neutral elements of these operations, the partial ordering ≤rcf and it satisfies all 
properties of real closed fields.  
The formal semantics of SLP expressions, that are not probabilistic, are identical to the 
semantics given for SL in [12]. The presentation of the semantic for the entire SLP logics is 
out of the scope of present work (it is defined in [7]), however, here we will define the formal 
semantics of the basic belief relation B(a,ϕ) and of the new probabilistic term BP(a,ϕ), to 
show the correlation between these two constructions.  
Definition 1. The modal operator B(a,ϕ) expresses the fact that the agent a beliefs that the 
sentence ϕ is true in a model M, world w and evaluation function v if and only if ϕ is true in 
any world w’ which can be reached from w using Ba the belief accessibility relation for the 
agent a:  
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M,w,v |== B(a,ϕ)  iff M,w’,v |== ϕ,    for all w’ such that w Ba w’.    
Definition 2. The semantic of the probabilistic term BP(a,ϕ) is the probability estimated 
by agent a that ϕ is true. This probability is calculated summing up the distribution function 
µa over the worlds where agent a believe that ϕ is true: 
[BP(a,ϕ)]M,w,v = µa ({w’ | wBaw’ and M,w’,v |== ϕ})   
Besides these definitions, we add two assumptions to the formal model of SLP. 
Assumption 3. The following equivalences are valid in SLP: 
B(a, ϕ) ⇔ BP(a, ϕ)=1              
U(a, ϕ) ⇔ BP(a, ϕ)=0.5           
This assumption states the basic relationship between probabilistic and non-probabilistic 
(i.e. purely logical) beliefs in SLP and between "absolute" uncertainties and probabilistic 
beliefs. 
Assumption 4. Any formula ϕ inside BP(a,ϕ) terms must be a sentence (a closed for-
mula) of the logic. Numerical constants or variables cannot be used as arguments of logical 
predicates (and vice-versa).  
The axiomatic system of SLP was built over the axiomatic system of SL. It incorporates 
all axioms and inference rule from SL. To support probabilities were added the axiomatic 
system for the real closed field of numbers and axioms and inference rules equivalent to 
Kolmogorov axioms for Probability Theory. 
3.3 Properties of SLP Logic 
The basic properties of SLP are enunciated in the following propositions. 
Proposition 5. Any valid formula of SL is also a valid formula of SLP and any purely 
logical valid formula of SLP is a valid formula of SL.?  
The proof of this proposition is not so simple because of assumption 3 which forces that 
every world with nonzero probability from a M model can be reached by any other world of 
this model through the B relation, something that is not required in SL (or in other epistemic 
modal logics). Even so, it was possible to prove in [7], that any valid model of SL is also a 
valid model of SLP and vice-versa and thus proves the proposition 5. 
Proposition 6. The axiomatic system of SLP is correct.?  
 The new axioms and inference rules of SLP are derived from the axiomatic theory of 
probabilities from Kolmogorov and from the axiomatic theory of the real field, both proved 
correct axiomatic systems. 
In our proposed extension to SL, we have taken special care to avoid the problem of un-
decidability of probabilistic logics described in [1]. We have found a very interesting result, 
showing that there is a simpler and intuitive set of restrictions, not so strong as the restrictions 
proposed by Halpern and Bacchus that keep the resulting axiomatic system complete.  
Proposition 7. The axiomatic system of SLP is complete if the axiomatic system of SL is 
also complete.?  
The basic insight that lead us to the (relative) completeness proof of SLP was based on 
the observation that the incompleteness proof for probabilistic logics made by Abadi and 
Halpern [1] relied on the fact that the same variables can be "shared" by terms inside prob-
abilistic operator and logical formulas outside these operators, i.e., it is possible to have 
expressions like P(x,y) ∧ BP(Q(x))=r, where the variable x is shared by P(x,y) and Q(x) 
inside the BP operator. The consequence is that if we not allow shared variables between 
probabilistic terms and logical formulas, then Abadi technique will not work. This is not the 
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istic terms and logical formulas, then Abadi technique will not work. This is not the same to 
say that the corresponding axiomatic system is complete, but it shows that this should be 
possible. Indeed, if we do not allow this kind of sharing, as is the case of SLP because of 
assumption 4, it is possible to use proof techniques developed by Halpern [9] and separate 
the probabilistic and non-probabilistic parts of some formula. This is the basic method em-
ployed on the completeness proof of SLP. In [7] it was shown that the validity of any formula 
ϕ of SLP can be reduced to the validity of an equivalent formula ψ ∧ π, where ψ is a purely 
logical formula containing no numerical or probabilistic term and π is a purely numerical 
formula containing no logical predicate/term neither any probabilistic term. 
 In this case, the validity of formula ψ is entirely dependant on the original SL axiomatic 
system and the validity of π depends on the first order axiomatic theory of real closed fields 
that, by a well-known result of Tarski, is a decidable problem. This result was proved using a 
finitary generalization of the Halpern techniques presented in [9] to substitute probabilistic 
terms that contain closed first order modal formulas with universally quantified numerical 
variables.  
4 Communication of Probabilistic Knowledge 
4.1 Principles for Probabilistic Communication 
The FIPA ACL semantic depends on several logical axioms that define principles for 
agency and communication theories (see [11,12] for details). The theory of agency employed 
by FIPA includes rationality, persistency and consistency principles for beliefs, choices and 
intentions of agents defined as SL axioms and theorems. The theory of communication is 
formed by several axioms that define communication principles like the belief adjustment, 
sincerity, pertinence and cooperation principles besides the 5 basic communication properties 
stated in FIPA ACL specification [6]. These principles are generally sufficient to handle rea-
soning needs for communication purposes in any rational BDI agent that is FIPA compliant 
(at least when the sender’s agent centered semantics used by FIPA ACL is appropriate for 
the application or domain in question). In being so, our first principle can be stated as the 
following assumption. 
Assumption 8 Agents that need to communicate probabilistic knowledge and intend to 
use FIPA-ACL should also respect the theory of agency and the theory of communication 
proposed in FIPA standards. 
 This assumption is perfectly reasonable because of compatibility between SL and SLP 
assured by proposition 5, that implies that any valid theory of SL is a valid theory of SLP. 
However, when agents use probabilistic reasoning and need to use this kind of knowledge 
for communication purposes, then the purely logical theories of agency and communication 
are not much useful. To handle these situations we propose that these theories be extended by 
two new principles that will be able to bridge the gap between purely logical considerations 
and probabilistic reasoning, in terms of agent’s communication decisions. We will propose 
only a minimum set of new principles, strictly necessary to correlate probabilistic knowledge 
used by the agent to decision and inference processes related to communication tasks.  
One fundamental property of FIPA theory is the principle that assures the agreement be-
tween the mental state of some agent and their beliefs [12]. Using this principle is possible to 
assert propositions like B(a, ϕ) ↔ B(a, B(a, ϕ) )  and BP(a,ϕ)=1↔B(a,BP(a,ϕ)=1), if all 
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propositions and predicate symbols in ϕ appears in the scope of a modal operator formalizing 
a mental attitude of agent a: 
  This is an interesting fact but is very limited in the case of probabilistic communication. 
The principles of FIPA’s theory of communication assume that the agent must believe non-
probabilistically in some fact, before the communication starts. Therefore, what we need is 
some principle that will allow us to correlate probabilistic beliefs with non-probabilistic be-
liefs. This is assured by the following proposition of SLP. 
Proposition 9. Principle of Probabilities and Beliefs Agreement: if some agent a assume 
that the probability of proposition ϕ is p, then this is equivalent to state that it also believe in 
this fact: 
  |== BP(a, ϕ)=p ↔ B(a, BP(a, ϕ)=p ) ?      
This principle allows agents to put any probabilistic beliefs “inside” epistemic belief 
operators and then to use any other axioms and theorems of communication or agency 
theories to make communication related reasoning. 
The proposition 9 is necessary but is not enough. We need some kind of reason to effec-
tively start some new communicative act. In FIPA this is assured by the principle of belief 
adjustment [12] that states that if some agent a believe in ϕ, believe that is competent in this 
belief and thinks that another agent b do not believe in ϕ, then it adopts the intention to make 
b believe in ϕ: 
╞═ B(a, ϕ ∧ B(b, ¬ϕ) ∧ Comp(a, ϕ)) → I(a, B(b, ϕ))  
The predicate Comp(a,φ) states the competence of agent a about ϕ. 
 The belief adjustment principle also falls in the same limiting situation of the mental state 
and belief agreement principle when applied to the probabilistic case. Therefore, we need 
another principle stated in the following proposition. 
Proposition 10. Principle of Probabilities Adjustment: if some agent a believe that the 
probability of proposition ϕ is p, believe that it is competent in this belief and also believe 
that another agent b have different estimation for the probability of ϕ, then it should adopt 
the intention to make agent b also believe that the probability of ϕ is p: 
|== BP(a,ϕ)=p ∧ BP(a,BP(b,ϕ)=p)<1 ∧ B(a,Comp(a,BP(a,ϕ)=p))) → I(a, BP(b, ϕ)=p) ? 
This principle is derived from belief adjustment principle, using the proposition 9 stated 
before (see [7] for details). It will have the same function of belief adjustment principle for 
the probabilistic reasoning case, providing agents with intentions to solve perceived differ-
ences between probabilistic beliefs shared by several agents.  
4.2 Communicative Acts for Probabilities 
Like SL, SLP also can be used as a content representation language for FIPA-ACL 
communicative acts. This allows the representation and distribution of probabilistic knowl-
edge like BN between agents using standard assertive (inform) acts. However, to do this is 
necessary to assume a particular structure in the contents of these acts. The assertive acts 
defined in Speech Act theory (and the equivalent inform FIPA-ACL acts) do not assume 
any particular internal structure in the propositions passed as contents of these acts. So, in the 
general case of probabilistic communication not seem reasonable to always assume a particu-
lar structure in the content of assertive act used to communicate probabilities. To handle this 
we propose that the strength (or weakness) of the assertive force of some speech act should 
be measured by a probability. In this way, any kind of propositions can be used as contents of 
these probabilistic assertive acts, because the (subjective) probability of the proposition will 
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be transmitted as a graduation of the force. This graduation is a numerical coefficient that 
represents the subjective probability of the proposition (i. e., the graduation of the assertive 
force is directly related to the belief degree on the proposition).  Two new probabilistic 
communicative acts were defined. They are considered extensions to the FIPA-ACL, creat-
ing the Probabilistic Agent Communication Language (PACL).  
The acts inform-bp and query-bp acts are defined, respectively, to allow that the 
information about subjective probabilities of an agent to be shared with other agents and to 
allow that a given agent could query the degree of belief of another agent. Using the notation 
employed by FIPA-ACL [6] the inform-bp act is formalized as follows: 
<a, inform-bp (b, <ϕ, p>)>   
   FP: BP(a,ϕ)=p ∧ BP(a, BP(b,ϕ)=p)<1     
   RE: BP(b,ϕ)=p  
This act informs the probability for some closed formula ϕ. The feasibility precondition 
of the act (FP) requires only that an agent to believe that the subjective probability of ϕ is p 
and that another agent b has the chance of not believing in this fact. In this case, if the other 
necessary conditions are fulfilled (see [6]), then the inform-bp act will be emitted.  The ra-
tional effect (RE) that is expected with the act emission is that agent b also comes to believe 
that the probability of ϕ is p. 
The query-bp act was also modeled after an analysis of the query-if act, which is its 
similar when dealing with truth-values. This directive act is used to retrieve the probabilistic 
information associated to a particular proposition. 
4.3 Examples 
The use of inform-bp acts is straightforward. Assume that some agent a believe that 
agent b have a different estimation of the probability of ϕ and also believe that his estimation 
is competent: 
BP(a,ϕ)=p ∧ B(a, BP(b,ϕ)≠BP(a,ϕ)) ∧ B(a,Comp(a,BP(a,ϕ)=p)))       (1) 
Using the axioms and inference rules of SLP it is possible to infer, from B(a, 
BP(b,ϕ)≠BP(a,ϕ)) and BP(a,ϕ)=p, that ¬B(a, BP(b,ϕ)=p). But this is equivalent to   
BP(a,BP(b,ϕ)=p)<1, resulting: 
BP(a,ϕ)=p ∧ BP(a,BP(b,ϕ)=p)<1 ∧ B(a,Comp(a,BP(a,ϕ)=p)))        (2) 
Then, by (2) and proposition 10 the agent a need to assume the intention to inform b 
about the probability of ϕ. By the communication theory of FIPA this intention and beliefs 
stated in (2) are enough to cause the emission of the inform-bp act from a to b agent inform-
ing the probability of ϕ. 
If we force that agents a and b use SLP as content language and require that agent a be 
completely unsure if agent b knows the probability of ϕ, then it is also possible to use the 
inform acts of FIPA. The principle stated in proposition 9 allows to infer, from BP(a,ϕ)=p, 
that: 
  B(a,BP(a,ϕ)=p).                     (3) 
In FIPA inform act, the feasibility precondition (FP) also requires that agent a be com-
pletely unsure if the agent b knows some proposition ψ is stated as: 
¬B(a, B(b, ψ) ∨ B(b,¬ ψ) ∨  U(b, ψ) ∨  U(b,¬ ψ))           (4) 
Substituting ψ  in (4) by  BP(b,ϕ)=p we have: 
¬B(a,B(b,BP(b,ϕ)=p) ∨ B(b,¬BP(b,ϕ)=p) ∨ U(b,BP(b,ϕ)=p) ∨ U(b,¬BP(b,ϕ)=p))    (5) 
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So, agent a believes in (3) and if it also believes in (5) it can emit an inform act to agent 
b, with the proposition BP(a,ϕ)=p as the content of the act. 
5 Future Works 
Several interesting developments can follow our work. A direct possibility it is to check 
the influence of probabilistic knowledge and reasoning in other types of communicative acts 
and interaction protocols. Particularly interesting and related to our ongoing research it is the 
application of probabilistic knowledge and reasoning to model formally negotiation proto-
cols, mainly when these protocols are related to the pedagogical negotiation, which is a very 
complex form of interaction that occurs in intelligent learning environments (and class-
rooms) [8]. Another possibility is to use the logical representation schemes for BN (like the 
schemes presented in [2] and [7]) as a starting point for the research of shared ontologies for 
probabilistic knowledge. The considerable research work already done for logical based on-
tologies, can be applied to this new research.  
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